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Abstract. It has been observed lately that the dependence on moneylenders for borrowing 
needs of poor borrowers remained stable despite the presence of MFIs, particularly in 
developing economies. This is surprising given the fact that MFIs charge relatively lower 
interest rate as compared to moneylenders. The paper explains this trend by arguing that the 
effective cost of borrowing from MFI is higher relative to the effective cost of borrowing 
from moneylender. It is due to the additional burden incurred in the form of transaction 
costs in case of MFI borrowing. Simulation results also support this phenomenon. 
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1. Introduction 
ome recent estimates show that there are about 3,600 microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) serving about 190 million clients, of which nearly 130 
million are poorest (Reed, 2011 as cited in Goto, 2012). This translates to the 
impact of microfinance on one in every 37 people on earth (ibid.).  It is largely 
driven by following the group lending model of Grameen Bank in the form of self-
help group (SHG) bank - borrower linkage program in the Indian context. 
According to Sa-dhan, an association of MFIs in India, group loans account for 
more than 90% of the total loans disbursed by MFIs in India (Shankar, 2007). 
The success of microfinance group lending has led to an extensive and growing 
literature on the subject. The models of Stiglitz (1990), Besley & Coate (1995), 
Ghatak (1999) , Aghion (1999) and Aghion & Gollier (2000) show how Grameen 
type group lending with joint liability helps to mitigate the effect of information 
asymmetry between the lender and the borrower by exploiting the local 
information about the borrowers. This is made possible through borrowers’ 
participation in group formation, peer monitoring, and imposing social sanctions on 
the defaulting borrowers, among others.  
Notwithstanding the extensive and still growing literature on microfinance and 
group lending, most theoretical literature has approached the group based lending 
from the lenders’ perspective. Under group lending with joint liability, dynamic 
incentives and weekly repayment schedule, lenders can charge lower interest rate 
due to decreased information asymmetry (and consequent reduction in cost of 
screening and monitoring of borrowers) and yet achieve high repayment rate. This 
is a perspective from the lender. However, borrowers need to bear transaction costs 
when they borrow in groups. This includes the opportunity cost of attending 
weekly repayment meetings, cost of travelling to attend meetings etc. The problem 
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of borrowers’ transaction costs in group lending has been discussed by Chung 
(1995), Bhatt & Tang (1998) (who term these costs as ‘hidden beasts’), Pal (2002), 
Karduck & Seibel (2004), Dehem & Hudon (2013), among others. With the 
inclusion of these transaction costs in the regular interest cost, the effective cost of 
borrowing from MFI may increase up to the level of cost of borrowing from 
moneylenders (ML) and this may defeat the very purpose of introducing group-
based lending and reducing dependence on ML who are observed to charge very 
high interest rates. 
In this paper, we attempt to understand the trade-off that a typical borrower 
faces when she has a choice of borrowing from MFI or from ML. The trade-off 
originates because of the additional burden on the borrower in the form of 
transaction cost when she borrows from MFI while at the same time incurring a 
relative lower interest cost. On the other hand, borrowing from ML comes at higher 
interest cost without incurring any transaction cost. Hence, there is no 
unambiguous answer to the question of which option (borrowing from MFI or from 
ML) is viable from the borrower’s perspective assuming the unavailability of 
competing MFIs. 
We provide a theoretical framework around the effective cost of borrowing 
from MFI. We consider two alternative frameworks. The first framework expresses 
transaction cost as a mark-up over the interest cost and computes the total cost of 
credit using the internal rate of return (IRR) methodology. We name this as 
effective MFI interest rate. The second framework expresses the effective cost of 
MFI borrowing in terms of borrowers’ payoff functions and compares it with the 
effective cost of ML borrowing per unit of capital. This determines the maximum 
MFI interest rate at which the effective cost of MFI borrowing remains lower than 
that of ML borrowing. We call this maximum MFI interest rate as reservation MFI 
interest rate. 
We extend the theoretical results derived on effective MFI interest rate and 
reservation MFI interest rate by performing numerical simulations. The parameter 
estimates to perform simulations are taken from transaction cost estimation studies 
done in the Indian context, primarily Karduck & Seibel (2004), Shankar (2007), 
Dehem & Hudon (2013), among others. Results show that the effective cost of 
borrowing from MFI is higher or lower relative to the effective cost of borrowing 
from ML depending upon credit requirement, transaction cost burden, installment 
size, among others. Borrowers may find comparative advantage in borrowing 
individually from ML as compared to borrowing in a group from MFI when the 
credit requirement is low as in the case of poor and marginal borrowers. These 
results partly explain the relative stable dependence on ML credit market in 
economies having group lending microcredit activities. 
The paper is organized into five sections. This introductory section gives an 
overview about the context, objective and a brief mention of results derived. 
Section 2 and 3 formulates expressions for effective MFI interest rate and 
reservation MFI interest rate respectively. It is followed by the simulation results 
on effective MFI interest rate and reservation MFI interest rate in sub-sections 4.1 
and 4.2 respectively. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Effective MFI interest rate 
We assume that there is a project which requires an investment of amount K at 
the beginning of period 1 and will realize returns at the end of period 2 with full 
certainty. The project is assumed to be indivisible implies investment of amount 
less than K will not produce any returns in period 2. There is an MFI which offers 
group loans at an interest rate of r (r > 0), while ML provides individual loans at an 
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interest rate of m, where m > r.  MFI contract involves repaying in installments, 
while ML contract does not involve any installments and the entire loan amount 
needs to get repaid at the end of period 2.  
Borrowers are assumed to be identical and are endowed with a project requiring 
an investment of amount K. In addition, they are assumed to be poor and marginal 
with no personal wealth and cannot afford to offer any collateral. The 
representative borrower needs to repay some amount, s,  to MFI with interest r as 
an installment at the end of period 1, and the remaining (K-s) with interest at the 
end of period 2 (Jain & Mansuri, 2003).It is assumed that there is no restriction on 
the amount borrowed either from MFI or from ML.  
When a borrower borrows from MFI, she incurs transaction costs, Tc(Tc> 0) and 
is assumed to be fixed. On the other hand, borrowing from ML does not involve 
any transaction costs for the borrower. Ahmed (1989) argues that transaction costs 
are primarily incurred prior to or at the time of obtaining the loan. Hence,we 
assume that the net effective amount borrowed for an individual borrower reduces 
to (K – Tc) (Ahmed, 1989; Rojas& Rojas, 1997). Also, we assume that MFI 
charges interest rate on flat rate basis. It implies that interest liability is calculated 
as a fixed percentage of the initial loan amount rather than the amount outstanding 
(declining) during the loan term. 
Suppose E is the effective MFI interest rate (E > 0) and A1, A2 are the 
repayments to MFI at the end of 1
st
 and 2
nd
 period respectively. We assume that 
MFI is profit maximizer period by period (Jain, 1999; Aghion, 1999) and 
repayments happen with interest in both first and second period. A1 is the amount 
of first installment (s) paid to MFI with interest at the end of first period and A2 is 
the remaining amount (K – s) to be repaid with interest at the end of second period.  
To determine the effective MFI interest rate, we use the method of internal rate 
of return (IRR). The IRR method is used to determine the rate at which the future 
cash outflows should be discounted so that its present value equalizes the effective 
amount borrowed.Given the assumption of two periods and making use of IRR 
formula, we have the following: 
 
 
 
 
Putting 1A s(1 r)   and 2A (K s)(1 r)   , the above expression is re-written as: 
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Solving for E yields the following effective MFI interest rate E*, 
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Proof: See Appendix 1 
For E* to have meaningful value, the term inside square root should be non-
negative. This always holds true when we have K > Tc. The restriction on amount 
borrowed (K) being larger than transaction costs (Tc) is in congruence with the 
transaction costs estimation studies done in the Indian context like Karduck & 
Seibel (2004), Dehem & Hudon (2013) etc.  
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The comparative statics results on the effective MFI interest rate show that: 
Lemma 1 An increase in transaction cost leads to increase in effective interest 
rate. 
Lemma 2 The relation between effective interest rate and amount borrowed is 
negative. 
Lemma 3 An increase in actual MFI interest rate charged results in an increase 
in effective MFI interest rate. 
Lemma 4 There is a positive relation between MFI installment amount and 
effective MFI interest rate. 
Proof: See Appendix 2  
The above lemmas establish that effective MFI interest rate is higher than the 
actual MFI interest rate when Tc is assumed to be high or K is relatively low or 
both. This is shown by lemma 1 and lemma 2 wherein the relation between E* and 
Tc is positive and the relation between E* and K is negative. Lemma 3 shows an 
increased interest cost burden results in an increased effective cost of borrowing. 
An increased installment size is also associated with higher effective MFI interest 
rate. This is due to the fact that the installment amount s if gets invested at the end 
of period 1 (instead of paying back to MFI) will earn some returns by the end of 
period 2. Hence, there is an opportunity cost involved in spending the amount s to 
repay MFI installment at the end of period 1. This leads to higher effective cost of 
borrowing from MFI.  
 
3. Reservation MFI interest rate 
In this section, we attempt to provide an alternative theoretical framework to the 
trade-off of borrowing from MFI or from ML in the form of borrowers’ payoff 
functions. As in the previous section, we assume that MFI contracts are group 
lending contracts while the ML contracts are individual contracts. The interest rate 
charged by MFI (r) is lower while that of ML (m) is higher. There is a project 
which requires an investment of amount K (K > 0) at the beginning of period 1 and 
is expected to fetch returns at the end of period 2. A representative borrower is 
assumed to be poor and marginal with no ability to offer collateral. 
The MFI group lending contract specifies an installment amount s which needs 
to be repaid at the end of period 1 and the remaining amount (K – s) needs to be 
repaid at the end of second period with interest. Since returns are only realized at 
the end of period 2, hence the borrower borrows from ML an amount of s(1+r) to 
repay MFI installment  (Jain & Mansuri, 2003). There are transaction costs Tc 
involved in borrowing from MFI. Tc indicates total transaction cost burden per 
member in a group of 2 members. Therefore, the effective cost of borrowing from 
MFI (ECMFI) per unit of amount borrowed for an individual borrower becomes: 
 
 MFI c
1
EC s(1 r)(1 m) 2(K s)(1 r) T (1 r)
K
                      (2) 
 
The first component, s(1+r)(1+m), is the amount which needs to be repaid to ML at 
the end of second period with interest rate m. The second component, 2(K-s)(1+r), 
is the residual amount which needs to be paid back to MFI adjusted for joint 
liability (assuming 100% joint liability share and probability of default). The last 
component, Tc(1+r), is the opportunity cost of transaction cost amount, assuming 
that if it gets invested, it will earn returns at the rate of r. The whole expression is 
divided by K to get per unit cost.  
The effective cost of borrowing from ML (ECML) per unit of amount borrowed 
for an individual borrower takes the following form: 
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ML
K(1 m)
EC (1 m)
K

         (3) 
The component K(1+m) is the total cost of borrowing when she borrows the 
entire amount K from ML. The expression is divided by the amount borrowed K to 
get per unit cost. 
To derive an expression for the maximum MFI interest rate r at which the 
effective cost of borrowing from MFI remains lower than that of ML, we put 
MFI MLEC EC  
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Solving for r leads to the following, 
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r* can be interpreted as the ‘reservation’ level of MFI interest rate at which the 
effective cost of borrowing per unit of amount borrowed from MFI and from ML 
are equal. At this reservation MFI interest rate, the borrower is indifferent between 
borrowing from MFI and borrowing from ML. When the actual interest rate 
charged r is greater than r*, the effective cost of borrowing from MFI exceeds the 
effective cost of borrowing from ML and borrower will prefer to borrow from ML. 
The opposite holds true when the actual interest rate charged r is lower than r*. 
Therefore,  
 
If r > r*, then ECMFI> ECML      (5) 
If r < r*, then ECMFI< ECML      (6) 
 
However, the reservation r* derived above can take negative values also 
particularly when transaction costs are too high. As shown in equation (6), if r is 
lower than r* then the effective cost of borrowing from MFI is less and borrower 
will prefer to borrow from MFI. However, if r* is negative, MFI cannot offer loans 
at r lower than r*. This is due to the assumption of MFI being profit maximizer. 
For r* to be non-negative, it must satisfy the condition of c(K s)(m 1) T   . The 
installment amount s cannot be greater than the amount borrowed K which implies 
the expression (K – s) is non-negative. Transaction costs Tc is assumed to be 
strictly positive. Hence, to satisfy the condition of c(K s)(m 1) T   , ML interest 
rate m has to be at least of the level of 1. 
The comparative statics results on reservation MFI interest rate are used to 
derive the following lemmas: 
Lemma 5 Reservation interest rate falls with the increase in transaction cost.  
Lemma 6 An increase in amount borrowed results in an increase in reservation 
level of interest rate. 
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Lemma 7 There is a positive relation between ML interest rate and reservation 
interest rate. 
Lemma 8 A marginal increase in installment amount is associated with a lower 
level of reservation MFI interest rate. 
Proof: See Appendix 3 
Lemma 5 implies borrower will be willing to pay lower r* to MFI if Tc 
increases. Higher amount borrowed is associated with higher reservation MFI 
interest rate. This implies MFI’s pool of clients gets increased with the higher K 
and consequent increase in r* as shown by equation (6). An increase in ML interest 
rate increases the cost of alternate source of credit (ML) and hence leads borrowers 
willing to pay higher r* to MFI. An increase in installment amount raises the 
amount borrowers need to borrow from ML, s(1 + r), to repay MFI installment. ML 
loans are availed at higher interest cost m. This translates to relative lower 
borrowing from MFI and is associated with lower level of reservation r*. 
 
4. Simulation results 
To gain some insight to the theoretical results derived above, we perform 
simulations on the effective MFI interest rate E* and reservation MFI interest rate 
r*, changing one of the parameters among s, K, m, r and Tc at a time, while keeping 
others at some constant value. The range of parameter estimates are taken from 
reviewing some of the empirical studies done in the Indian context. The most 
relevant in our context are Karduck & Seibel (2004), Banerjee & Duflo (2010), 
Dehem & Hudon (2013), Pradhan (2013) and Seenivasan (2015). Although 
Shankar (2007) also estimated transaction costs in the Indian context, however the 
attempt was made from the lender’s (MFI) perspective and not from the borrower’s 
perspective.  
Karduck & Seibel (2004) estimated average loans outstanding from SHGs at 
INR (Indian Rupee) 6,690 per member annually at the lending rate of around 24% 
per annum. The annual transaction cost is estimated at INR 156 per member. 
Banerjee & Duflo (2010) pegged ML interest rate of around 57% per annum. 
Dehem & Hudon (2013) estimated average loan size separately for rural and urban 
borrowers at around INR 3,884 and INR 3,878 per borrower respectively. There is 
a wide variation observed in average annual transaction costs among rural and 
urban borrowers at an approximate of INR 290 and INR 350 per member 
respectively. Pradhan (2013) observed that ML interest rate varies to the extent of 
50% or more in the Indian context. The paper showed around one-third of the ML 
debt is borrowed at an interest rate of around 20-25%, while another one-third 
(approx. 38%) is borrowed at an interest rate of more than 30%.  
In particular, we consider the parameter range of K between 3800 and 6800, Tc 
between 150 and 400, and s between 1500 and 3500. We consider the r values 
varying in the range of 12% and 25%, and m values varying in the range of 100% 
and 200% in the respective simulation results on effective MFI interest rate and 
reservation MFI interest rate.  While keeping parameter values at some constant 
level, we have kept r at 24% as per the RBI mandate in the Indian context 
(Karduck & Seibel, 2004; Seenivasan, 2015). The installment amount (s) is 
assumed to be one half of amount borrowed (K) in most of the simulation cases 
shown below. The relevant graphs are shown in the respective cases. The graphs 
below plot effective MFI interest rate/reservation MFI interest rate on Y-axis and 
the parameter considered on X-axis. 
4.1. Simulation results on effective MFI interest rate  
We consider four cases in total described in Table 1 below. We fix three 
parameters at a time and change any one of the parameters among s, K, Tc and r. 
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This is shown under header Fixed (parameters fixed at a particular value) and 
Variable (parameter changing value in a continuous range) in the table below. We 
consider four to five parameter combination values for each case. These four cases 
on effective MFI interest rate are shown in figures 1 to 4. 
 
Table 1.Parameter combinations considered in simulation results on effective MFI interest 
rate 
Figure 1 Figure 2 
Fixed Variable Fixed Variable 
s, K, Tc r (0.12, 0.25) s, r, Tc K (3800, 6800) 
a) s = 1950, K = 3900, Tc = 350  a) s = 1950, r = 0.24, Tc = 350 
b) s = 1950, K = 3900, Tc = 290 b) s = 1950, r = 0.24, Tc = 290 
c) s = 3350, K = 6700, Tc = 350 c) s = 3350, r = 0.24, Tc = 350 
d) s = 3350, K = 6700, Tc = 290 d) s = 3350, r = 0.24, Tc = 290 
e) s = 3350, K = 6700, Tc = 160 e) s = 3350, r = 0.24, Tc = 160 
Figure 3 Figure 4 
Fixed Variable Fixed Variable 
s, r, K Tc (150, 400) r, K, Tc s(1500, 3500) 
a) s = 1950, r = 0.24, K = 3900 a) K = 3900, r = 0.24, Tc = 350 
b) s = 2800, r = 0.24, K = 3900 b) K = 3900, r = 0.24, Tc = 290 
c) s = 3350, r = 0.24, K = 6700 c) K = 6700, r = 0.24, Tc = 350 
d) s = 5000, r = 0.24, K = 6700 d) K = 6700, r = 0.24, Tc = 290 
Source: The author 
 
The graph in figure 1 shows effective interest rate E on Y-axis and actual 
interest rate r on X-axis. When amount borrowed is relatively high (6700), 
effective interest rate turns out to be lower than actual interest rate r in the entire 
range of r (0.12, 0.25). It holds true for all the three cases c, d and e. At the lower K 
values (3900), effective interest rate E is higher than actual interest rate r under 
certain combination of parameter values (s, Tc). However, with K being 6700,E 
becomes lower than r because of economies of scale. 
 
 
Figure 1.Effective MFI interest rate as a function of interest rate r 
 
The graph in figure 2 shows effective interest rate E on Y-axis and amount 
borrowed K on X-axis. The divergence in effective interest rate among the five 
cases considered is high at lower values of amount borrowed and becomes lower as 
K increases.  Graphs show with the increase in amount borrowed K, effective 
interest rate converges to the actual interest rate of 0.24, and after a certain 
threshold becomes lower than 0.24. When the installment size is small (1950), 
effective rate is shown to be lower than interest rate r in the entire range of K 
considered (3800, 6800). This holds true for both cases a and b. Effective rate 
becomes higher than r when the amount borrowed is low and installment size as a 
percentage of amount borrowed is high. 
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Figure 2. Effective MFI interest rate as a function of amount borrowed K 
 
The graph in figure 3 puts effective interest rate E on Y-axis and transaction 
costs on X-axis. The change in effective rate with response to a unit change in 
transaction cost also depends upon the amount borrowed. The curve is relatively 
steeper for cases a and b when K is small (3900) as compared to the cases c and d 
when K is high (6700). This shows transaction cost impacts poor borrowers 
relatively more who are believed to have low requirement of credit.E is higher than 
r for high transaction cost values and relatively low values of amount borrowed in 
most of the parameter combinations considered. However, these results depend to a 
great extent upon the size of installment as a percentage of amount borrowed. 
When installment size is one-half of the amount borrowed (3900), E is higher than 
r when Tc is more than 370 on an average (case a).With installment size of about 
75% of amount borrowed (3900) as in case b, E is shown to be higher than r for Tc 
being in the range of (210, 400). In case c with K and s at 6700 and 3350 
respectively, effective rate is lower than interest rate r in the entire range of Tc 
considered. However, if s is increased to 5000 (~70% of K) as in case d, E 
becomes higher than r when transaction costs lie in the range of (330, 400). 
 
 
Figure 3. Effective MFI interest rate as a function of transaction costs Tc 
 
The graph in figure 4 shows effective interest rate E on Y-axis and installment size 
s on X-axis. The positive relation is found between increasing installment size s 
and effective interest rate E. However, the rate of change in effective interest rate is 
observed to be high (shown by steeper curve) when K is relatively small at 3900 as 
shown in the graphs of cases a and b. 
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Figure 4. Effective MFI interest rate as a function of installment size s 
 
4.2. Simulation results on reservation MFI interest rate 
As in previous sub-section, we have four cases described in Table 2 below. We 
fix three parameters at a time and change any one of the parameters among s, K, Tc 
and m. These four cases on reservation MFI interest rate are shown in figures 5 till 
8. 
Figure 5 shows reservation MFI interest rate as a function of ML interest rate. 
With m values varying in the range of (1, 2), reservation r* is positive beyond a 
certain threshold of m. When K is relatively low at 3900 and installment size being 
one half of it, reservation r* becomes positive when m crosses a threshold of 1.18 
given transaction cost level of 350 as in case a. A decrease in transaction cost level 
to 290 in case b leads to lower corresponding threshold m of 1.15. 
The threshold m beyond which reservation r* becomes positive is lower in case 
of higher K (6700). For given values of K and s at 6700 and 3350 respectively in 
cases c, d and e, higher transaction cost levels lead to increase in threshold m. 
Threshold m is 1.05 in case e, gets increased to 1.09 in case d and further to 1.10 in 
case c. 
 
 
Figure 5. Reservation MFI interest rate as a function of ML interest rate m 
 
 
 
Table 2.Parameter combinations considered in simulation results on reservation MFI 
interest rate 
Figure 5 Figure 6 
Fixed Variable          Fixed Variable 
s, K, Tc m (1, 2) s, m, Tc K (3800, 6800) 
a) K = 3900, s = 1950, Tc = 350 a) m = 1.1, s = 1950, Tc = 350 
b) K = 3900, s = 1950, Tc = 290 b) m = 1.1, s = 1950, Tc = 290 
c) K = 6700, s = 3350, Tc = 350 c) m = 1.1, s = 3350, Tc = 350 
d) K = 6700, s = 3350, Tc = 290 d) m = 1.1, s = 3350, Tc = 290 
e) K = 6700, s = 3350, Tc = 160 e) m = 1.1, s = 3350, Tc = 160 
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Figure 6 shows the reservation MFI interest rate as a function of amount 
borrowed K. The reservation r* is shown to be positive for high values of 
parameter K. In case a, r* becomes positive when K is greater than the level of 
5450, while in case b it happens when K is greater than the level of 4850. At higher 
installment size values of 3350, r* is positive for K being higher than 4950 when 
transaction cost is fixed at the level of 160 as in case e. An increase in transaction 
cost from 160 to 290 leads to increase the threshold K from 4950 to 6250 (case d). 
A further increase in transaction cost levels to 350 (case c) leads to negative r* for 
all the values of K in the range of (3800, 6800). 
 
 
Figure 6. Reservation MFI interest rate as a function of amount borrowed K 
 
The graph in figure 7 shows reservation MFI interest rate as a function of 
installment size s.  A higher installment size reduces the reservation r* borrowers 
are willing to pay to MFI. For the given levels of K and m, a higher transaction 
cost leads to lower reservation r* and hence shifts the r* curve downwards as 
shown in the r* curves for cases a, b and c. This implies borrowers are willing to 
pay less interest rate for each level of installment size when there is an increased 
transaction cost burden. Reservation r* is negative for all values of s when the 
amount borrowed is low (K = 3900) as shown in cases d and e. 
 
 
Figure 7. Reservation MFI interest rate as a function of installment size s 
 
Figure 7 Figure 8 
Fixed Variable Fixed Variable 
m, Tc, K s (1500, 
3500) 
m, K, s Tc (150, 400) 
a) m = 1.1, K = 6700, Tc = 350 a) m = 1.1, K = 6700, s = 3350 
b) m = 1.1, K = 6700, Tc = 290 b) m = 1.1, K = 6700, s = 4690 
c) m = 1.1, K = 6700, Tc = 160 c) m = 1.1, K = 3900, s = 1950 
d) m = 1.1, K = 3900, Tc = 350 d) m = 1.1, K = 3900, s = 2730 
e) m = 1.1, K = 3900, Tc = 290  
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Figure 8 depicts reservation MFI interest rate as a function of transaction cost. 
With the given level of amount borrowed and ML interest rate, higher installment 
size reduces reservation interest rate. This is shown by graph for case b lying below 
the graph for case a and similarly graph for case d being below the graph for case c. 
 
 
Figure 8. Reservation MFI interest rate as a function of transaction cost Tc 
 
The rate of change in reservation r* is low (curve is flatter) when the amount 
borrowed is high at 6700 compared to the case when it is less (3900). It is shown 
by the graphs for case a and b being flatter than the corresponding graphs for case c 
and d. This implies reservation r* is more responsive to transaction cost levels for 
poor borrowers who are having low requirement of credit. 
 
5. Conclusion 
To conclude, the effective cost of borrowing from MFI is high whenever there 
is higher transaction cost, higher installment size (as a % of amount borrowed) and 
lower amount borrowed. An increase in amount borrowed leads to decrease in 
effective MFI interest rate, while a higher installment size and transaction cost 
leads to increase in effective interest rate. An increase in amount borrowed is 
associated with higher reservation interest rate, while the relation with respect to 
installment size and transaction cost is negative.  
These results show that effective cost of borrowing from MFI is higher for poor 
and marginal borrowers who are in need for smaller amount of credit, although 
these are the set of borrowers to whom MFI lending is designed to be targeted. It is 
primarily explained by the higher transaction cost burden when borrowers borrow 
from MFI. Therefore, from the policy standpoint, these results reiterate the 
importance of reducing transaction costs to enhance borrower welfare as Bhatt & 
Tang (2001), Field & Pande (2008), Laureti (2012) and several other authors have 
pointed out. 
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Appendix 1 
Computing effective MFI interest rate E* (equation 1) 
Amount borrowed (effective) = K - Tc 
Suppose A1 and A2 are the amount paid to MFI at the end of 1
st and 2nd period respectively.   E is the 
effective rate of interest. By IRR formula, we have the following: 
1 2
c
2
A A
K T
(1 E) (1 E)
  
 
 
1A s(1 r)   and 2A (K s)(1 r)   . Putting these values in the above equation yields the 
following: 
c
2
s(1 r) (K s)(1 r)
K T
(1 E) (1 E)
  
  
 
 
  2cK T (1 E) s(1 r)(1 E) (K s)(1 r)         
Put (1+E) = z and solve for z, 
  2cK T z s(1 r)z (K s)(1 r) 0        
 
   
 
2
c
c c
4(K s)(1 r) K T s(1 r)s(1 r)
z
2 K T 2 K T
     
      
 
Ignoring the negative sign and substituting the value of z yields, 
   
 
2 2
c c
c
4(K s)(1 r) K T s (1 r) s(1 r) 2 K T
E E*
2 K T
        
 

 
E* is the effective MFI interest rate. 
For E* to have meaningful value, the term inside square root should be non-negative i.e. 
  2 2c4(K s)(1 r) K T s (1 r) 0       
With K > Tc(given that s K ), the above inequality always holds true. 
 
Appendix 2 
Comparative statics of effective MFI interest rate E* 
1. 
c
E*
T


 
 
    c c2
c c
E* 1 2(K s)(1 r)
K T 2 s(1 r) 2 K T
T 2 K T
     
         
    
 
where  2 2c4(K s)(1 r)(K T ) s (1 r)       
 
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0
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Hence, there is a positive relation between Tcand E*, because K >= s and K > Tc. 
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K
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
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Appendix 3 
Comparative statics of reservation MFI interest rate r* 
1. 
c
r *
T


 
 
 c c2
c c
r* 1
s(1 m) 2(K s) T K(K s)(m 1) T
T s(1 m) 2(K s) T

         
    
 
 
2
K(1 m)
0
 
 
 
2. r *
K


 
 
   c c2
c
r* 1
s(1 m) 2(K s) T (m 1) 2 (K s)(m 1) T
K s(1 m) 2(K s) T

               
 
 
 
c
2
(1 m) s(m 1) Tr*
K
  


 
r *
0
K



 for m > 1 
3. 
r *
m


 
 
   c c2
c
r* 1
s(1 m) 2(K s) T (K s) s (K s)(m 1) T
m s(1 m) 2(K s) T

               
 
 
2
c
2
r* 1
2s(K s) 2(K s) KT
m

      
 
r *
0
m



 
4. 
r *
s


 
 
 
 
c
2
cc
s(1 m) 2(K s) T (1 m)r* 1
s (K s)(m 1) T (m 1)s(1 m) 2(K s) T
     
  
           
 
 
2
r * K(1 m)(1 m)
s
  


 
r *
0
s



 for m > 1 
Journal of Economics Bibliography 
JEB, 3(1), A. Tutlani. p.134-147. 
147 
References 
Aghion, B.A. (1999). On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring, Journal of 
Development Economics, 60(1), 79-104. doi. 10.1016/S0304-3878(99)00037-1 
Aghion, B.A.,& Gollier, C. (2000). Peer group formation in an adverse selection model, The 
Economic Journal, 110(465): 632-643. doi. 10.1111/1468-0297.00557 
Ahmed, Z.A. (1989). Effective cost of rural loans in Bangladesh, World Development, 17(3), 357-
363. doi. 10.1016/0305-750X(89)90209-X 
Banerjee, A.V.,& Duflo, E. (2010). Giving credit where it is due, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
24(3), 61-80. doi. 10.1257/jep.24.3.61 
Besley, T.,& Coate, S.  (1995). Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral, Journal of 
Development Economics, 46(1), 1-18. doi. 10.1016/0304-3878(94)00045-E 
Bhatt, N.,& Tang, S.Y. (2001). Designing group-based microfinance programs: Some theoretical and 
policy considerations, International Journal of Public Administration, 24(10), 1103-1125. doi. 
10.1081/PAD-100105104 
Bhatt, N.,& Tang, S.Y. (1998). The problem of transaction costs in group-based micro lending: An 
institutional perspective, World Development, 26(4), 623-637. doi. 10.1016/S0305-
750X(98)00007-2 
Chung, I. (1995). Market choice and effective demand for credit: Roles of borrower transaction costs 
and rationing constraint, Journal of Economic Development, 20(2), 23-44.  
Dehem,T.,& Hudon, M. (2013). Microfinance from the clients’ perspective: An empirical enquiry 
into transaction costs in urban and rural India, Oxford Development Studies,  41(1), S117-S132. 
doi. 10.1080/13600818.2013.787057 
Field, E.,& Pande, R. (2008). Repayment frequency and default in microfinance: Evidence from 
India, Journal of the European Economic Association, 6(2-3), 501-509. doi. 
10.1162/JEEA.2008.6.2-3.501 
Ghatak, M. (1999). Group lending, local information and peer selection, Journal of Development 
Economics, 60(1), 27-50. doi. 10.1016/S0304-3878(99)00035-8 
Goto, H. (2012). Repayment Frequency and Repayment Performance in Microfinance, WIAS 
Discussion paper, No. 2012-002: WIAS 
Jain, S. (1999). Symbiosis vs. crowding-out: The interaction of formal and informal credit markets in 
developing countries, Journal of Development Economics, 59(2), 419-444. doi. 10.1016/S0304-
3878(99)00019-X 
Jain, S.,& Mansuri, G. (2003). A little at a time: The use of regularly scheduled repayments in 
microfinance programs, Journal of Development Economics, 72(1), 253-279. doi. 10.1016/S0304-
3878(03)00076-2 
Karduck, S.,& Seibel, H.D. (2004). Transaction costs of self-help groups: A study of NABARD’s 
SHG banking programme in India, [accessed October 10, 2015]. 
Laureti, C. (2012). Flexibility and payment discipline in microfinance, Manuscript, Belgium: Université de 
Mons and UniversitéLibre de Bruxelles. 
Pal, S. (2002). Household sectoral choice and effective demand for rural credit in India, Applied Economics, 
34(14), 1743-1755. doi. 10.1080/00036840210121228 
Pradhan, N.C. (2013). Persistence of informal credit in rural India: Evidence from ‘All-India Debt and 
Investment Survey’ and beyond, Working paper, WPS(DEPR)- 05/2013: RBI 
Reed, L. R. (2011)‘State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2011’, Microcredit Summit 
Campaign, Washington, DC. Quoted in Goto, H. (2012). Repayment Frequency and Repayment 
Performance in Microfinance, WIAS Discussion paper, No. 2012-002: WIAS 
Rojas, M., and Rojas, L.A. (1997). Transaction costs in Mexico’s preferential credit, Development Policy 
Review 15: 23-46. 
Seenivasan, R. (2015). High interest rates are an amorality in microfinance, Economic and Political Weekly 
3,75-77. 
Shankar, S (2007). Transaction costs in group microcredit in India’, Management Decision, 45(8), 1331-
1342. doi. 10.1108/00251740710819069 
Stiglitz, J.E. (1990). Peer monitoring and credit markets, The World Bank Economic Review, 4(3), 351-366. 
 
Copyrights 
Copyright for this article is retained by the author(s), with first publication rights granted to 
the journal. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the 
Creative Commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0). 
 
